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III. ARGUMENT 
A. DEFENDANTS DID NOT MEET THEIR BURDEN OF PRODUCTION ON THE 
ISSUE OF ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE 
i. The Citi Appellees mis-state the legal standard for summary 
judgment. The Citi Appellees' opposition to Victor's case rests entirely on a 
series of ipse dixits, factual mis-statements or mis-constructions of the law. In 
particular, they allege: 
The additional steps Appellees took to show that they were not timely 
served and that they did not have actual knowledge of the underlying 
action were not necessary to prove the lien void — the lien was prima 
facie void because of the absence of the lis pendens. Appellees bore 
the burden of introducing evidence of the exceptions. Appellant never 
met that burden, below or on appeal.1 
First, the Citi-Appellee incorrectly state the legal standard on summary judgment. 
Although at trial Victor would bear the burden of proof on whether the Citi 
Appellees received actual knowledge of Victor's lien action within 180 days, at 
the summary judgment stage of the proceeding it is the Citi-Appellees that must 
make an affirmative factual showing that Victor is not entitled to the benefit of the 
actual knowledge exception stated in Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1 l(3)(a). 
The summary judgment standard asserted by the Citi Appellees was 
1
 Aple. Br. p. 27. 
1 
explicitly rejected in Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, which clearly distinguishes 
summary judgment practice in Utah from the rule stated in Celotex v. Catrett, Ml 
U.S. 317,106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). In construing the summary 
judgment procedure under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, Celotex held that when the burden of 
proof at trial will be on the non-moving party, the moving party will be awarded 
summary judgment if it simply identifies: 
"'those portions of fthe pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any,' that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of 
material fact.' Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). The burden then 
shifts to the nonmoving party to show, by 'rebuttal affidavits, or other 
specified kinds of materials,' that there is a genuine issue of material 
fact. A/, at 324r2 
Thus, under Celotex proof that the non-moving party has not provided evidence 
that it can carry its burden of proof at trial is sufficient to grant the moving party 
summary judgment. 
Implicitly relying on the Celotex standard, the Citi Appellees incorrectly 
argue that at the summary judgment stage Victor "bore the burden of introducing 
the exceptions." If Celotex was controlling, this might well be dispositive of their 
summary judgment claims. But under the very definite and specific holding of 
Orvis, the Celotex standard has been rejected. Orvis holds that Waddoups v. 
2
 Orvis at 1115, citing Celotex v. Catrett, Ml U.S. 317,106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 
L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). 
2 
Amalgamated Sugar Co., 2002 UT 69, 54 P.3d 1054. (the case relied upon by 
those arguing that the Celotex standard controlled in Utah) cannot be interpreted 
"mean that a movant can satisfy her burden on summary judgment by 
"challenging] an element of the nonmoving party's case!f~in effect, 
by pointing out that the nonmoving party lacks sufficient evidence to 
support his claim. This interpretation overlooks the movant's 
affirmative obligation to first demonstrate that there exists no genuine 
issue of material fact."3 (citations omitted) 
Orvis expands on this rule by being even more explicit: 
A summary judgment movant, on an issue where the nonmoving party 
will bear the burden of proof at trial, may satisfy its burden on 
summary judgment by showing, by reference to "the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any," that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact. Upon such a showing, whether or not supported by 
additional affirmative factual evidence, the burden then shifts to the 
nonmoving party, who "may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of the pleadings," but "must set forth specific facts showing 
that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. (e). This is the correct 
application of Harline, and any subsequent cases applying Harline 
differently are incorrect.4[underlined emphasis added, other emphasis 
in the original] 
Note that the court unmistakably requires that the moving party employ 
affirmative factual evidence to put into issue the non-moving party's ability to 
prove at trial a matter for which the non-moving party bears the burden of proof. 
3
 Orvis atU 17. 
4
 Orvis aW 18. 
3^ 
In so ruling, Orvis explicitly re-affirms as controlling the holding in Harline v. 
Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 445 (Utah 1996) that: 
"Unless the moving party meets its initial burden to present evidence 
establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists, 'the party 
opposing the motion is under no obligation to demonstrate that there 
is a genuine issue for trial.'"5 
This re-affirmation of the holding in Harline refutes the Citi Appellees attempt at 
page 25 of their brief to distinguish Harline from this case. 
ii. The Beech and Flynn affidavits do not state any facts showing a lack 
of actual knowledge. Second, the affidavits of Beech and Flynn do no more than 
assert the legal conclusion that each of their corporations did not have actual 
knowledge of Victor's lien action within 180 days of its filing. For example, Mr. 
Beech avers that he "first learned of the existence and pendency of the above-
captioned litigation att he time Direct Mortgage Corporation was served process 
on June 14, 2006." (R. 141) But he says nothing about when Direct Mortgage 
Corporation learned of the filing of Victor's lien action. Instead, he merely recites 
that no one at Direct Mortgage Corporation had "actual knowledge" of Victor's 
lien action prior to June 14, 2006. (R. 141). 
All of the cases relied upon by the Citi Appellees regarding the waiving of 
defects in affidavits address situations where there were factual averments in the 
'Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 445 (Utah 1996) (quotingK&T, Inc. v. 
Koroulis, 888 P.2d 623, 628 (Utah 1994)). 
4 
affidavits - albeit evidentiarily defective ones - supporting a claim for summary 
judgment. Admittedly, if the Beech affidavit had contained unambiguous factual 
allegations regarding when Direct Mortgage Corporation "first learned" of the 
Victor lien action, regardless of whether the factual averments were evidentiarily 
defective, they may well have put Direct Mortgage Corporation's actual 
knowledge into issue. But the Beech affidavit does not contain unambiguous 
factual averments, and by instead doing no more than reciting the legal standard of 
actual knowledge imposed by Utah Code Ann. § 38-l-ll(3)(a), that affidavit put 
nothing before the trial court from which it could conclude that Direct Mortgage 
Corporation lacked actual knowledge.6 
This is an important distinction. Mr. Beech's statement as to his personal 
knowledge in the first sentence of paragraph 3 of his affidavit contrasts starkly 
with his next sentence where,7 in speaking of the corporation, he can do no more 
than draw a legal conclusion by reciting the legal standard of actual knowledge, 
6
 See Appl. Br @ pp.20 - 29 where it is argued that a likely inference from 
the Beech affidavit's conclusory allegation regarding a lack of actual knowledge is 
that Direct Mortgage Corporation had no way of knowing when it first learned of 
Victor's lien action, and assumed that lack of reporting systems meant it did not 
know of Victor's lien action until served. 
7
 When Mr. Beech is talking about his own personal knowledge he is 
testifying affirmatively about matters which he saw, observed or participated in. 
Indeed, he affirmatively states that he "first learned" of Victor's lien action when 
Direct Mortgage Corporation was served with process. His affirmative use of a 
non-legal term is clearly factual and not simply a conclusion of law. (R. 137). 
S 
something he is not qualified to do. Whether or not Direct Mortgage Corporation 
had actual knowledge is a legal question and his recitation of the applicable legal 
standard is not supported by any facts supporting this denial.8 Restated, although 
evidentiary defects may be waived by a non-moving party's failure to oppose an 
affidavit, under the holding in Badger v. Brooklyn Canal, 922 P. 2d 745 (Utah 
1996) the affidavit must still recite factual allegations to support a claim for 
summary judgment. 
In Badger the court held: 
"We find that the manner in which these affidavits were presented 
provided an insufficient factual basis for the district court's ruling. 
Ordinarily, the opponent to a summary judgment motion must 'set 
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.' 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). However, that burden is triggered only when 'a 
motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in 
this rule.' Id. (emphasis added). Unless the moving party meets its 
initial burden to present evidence establishing that no genuine issue 
of material fact exists, 'the party opposing the motion is under no 
obligation to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue for trial.' 
Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 445 (Utah 1996) (quoting K&T, Inc. 
v. Koroulis, 888 P.2d 623, 628 (Utah 1994)). The Madsen affidavit 
failed to negate any disputed issue regarding the impact of the change 
in diversion points on the private wells. Whatever expertise Madsen 
had acquired as an irrigator, it was not plainly pertinent to the 
question of impact on water tables; nor did he provide any 
foundational facts supporting his opinion. See, e.g., King v. Searle 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 832 P.2d 858, 864 n.2 (Utah 1992) 
('Affidavits of experts are insufficient. . . unless foundational facts 
are set forth supporting their opinions and conclusions.'). Rather, he 
sSee Capital Assets Financial Servs. v. Lindsay, 956 P.2d 1090,1094 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1998) (trial court must disregard legal conclusions in affidavits). 
6 
simply asserted in conclusory fashion that movement of water 
upstream could not impact the water table near plaintiffs' wells."9 
The conclusory statement at issue in Badger begged the question of what the 
affiant actually knew or whether his conclusion was the result of mere assumption. 
That is exactly the case with the Beech affidavit's conclusory allegations 
regarding actual knowledge. 
Goodnow v. Sullivan, 2002 UT 21, addresses the closely related issue of 
whether competing inferences resulting from conclusory fact allegations presented 
to a trial court prevent prevent the entry of summary judgment in reliance on those 
allegations. Goodnow holds that summary judgment cannot be granted where 
competing inferences are in issue.10 Applying Goodnow to Victor's case produces 
the same result. Because there are a number of competing inferences which accrue 
from the conclusory allegation of actual knowledge in the Beech affidavit, the trial 
court could only resolve those inferences by weighing the evidence, which it 
cannot do on summary judgment. 
Note also, that in Badger the affidavit in support of summary judgment was 
unopposed, which is also Victor's case. Badger was reaffirmed in the context of a 
lay person's affidavit by Dixon v. Pro Image, Inc., 1999 UT 89,1138, FN7, where 
9Badger® 752. 
10
 Goodnow at 13. 
7 
the court found that the party moving for summary judgment similarly failed to 
meet his initial burden of production to challenge the existence of an element of 
the non-moving party's cause of action. 
Moreover, under the authority of these cases, whether the Beech and Flynn11 
affidavits support a claim to summary judgment is determined under a correction 
of error standard, not an abuse of discretion standard.12 
In sum, although objections to the admissibility of the Beech and Flynn 
affidavits may have been waived, those affidavits must each still recite 
unambiguous facts supporting the Citi Appellees' summary judgment claims based 
on a lack of actual knowledge. Because they do not recite those facts, the Citi 
Appellees failed to meet their burden of production on this issue and so did not 
challenge or dispose of of an element of Victor's cause of action; that is, the issue 
of whether the Citi Appellees had actual knowledge. 
iii. At Summary Judgment the Citi Appellees Failed to Adduce Any 
Evidence That They Had an Interest in the Subject Property, In a belated 
11
 Excepting for its omissions of any averment as to when Mr. Flynn first 
learned of the filing of Victor's lien action, the Flynn affidavit does not materially 
differ from the Beech affidavit. 
12
 See Stephens v. Bonneville Travel, Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 519 (Utah 1997)(on 
appeal from the district court's ruling on summary judgment, an appellate court 
applies a correction of error standard, affording the trial courtTs rulings no 
deference). 
8 
attempt to bolster their case for summary judgment, at page 20 of their brief the 
Citi Appellees erroneously contend that the allegations in each of their answers 
that they had an interest in the property which was the subject of Victor's lien 
action, supports their motion for summary judgment. But Victor's complaint 
alleges that they have no interest or an interest which is inferior to Victor's.13 
Utah cases repeatedly hold that a moving party can only meet its initial burden by 
affirmatively producing dispositive evidence in support of its summary judgment 
motion.14 
Not only do the cases require the moving party to produce affirmative 
evidence, it is obvious that if the non-moving party cannot rely on its pleadings, 
the moving party cannot rely on its pleadings15 in support of its motion for 
summary judgment, otherwise a summary judgment would be no more than a 
motion to dismiss, and the factual allegations of the Plaintiff Victor's complaint 
regarding Direct Mortgage Corporation's inferior interest in the subject property 
must be taken as true.16 
13
 See Addendum A, 1115. 
14
 Orvis atU 18 citing Harline. 
15
 Appellant refers to pleadings in the strict sense used in Ut. R. Civ. P. 7(a). 
16
 See Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263, 264 (Utah 1995); cf. 
Blujfdale City v. Smith, 2007 UT App 25; 756 P3d 175 (Ut. App. 2007) (failure of 
non-moving party to specify in its opposing memorandum the evidentiary grounds 
for disputing the moving party's statement of undisputed material facts warranted 
9 
At page 20 of their brief the Citi Appellees also contend that their 
uncontested motion to substitute in CitiMortgage for Direct Mortgage Corporation 
was somehow dispositive of the issue of whether it had an interest in the subject 
property. But Rule 7(c)(3)(A) specifically provides that "Each fact set forth in the 
moving party's memorandum is deemed admitted for the purpose of summary 
judgment unless controverted by the responding party." By specifically limiting 
this rule to summary judgment memoranda, this Rule necessarily excludes factual 
assertions from other types of motions from its benefit.17 Moreover, the rule 
requires that those factual allegations be supported by evidence adduced through 
affidavits or discovery materials. Because CitiMortgage's motion to substitute in 
as a party defendant in this case had nothing to do with a summary judgment 
motion, the factual assertions in that motion to substitute are without evidentiary 
effect. 
This conclusion is further supported by the trial court's order granting the 
Citi Appellee's unopposed motion to substitute CitiMortgage for Direct Mortgage 
Corporation as a party Defendant. That order specifically finds that CitiMortgage 
summary judgment). A fortiori if the moving party relies on its answer and fails to 
adduce affirmative evidence in support of its summary judgment claims, those 
claims must fail. 
17
 See Field v. Boyer Co., 952 P.2d 1078, 1086-87 (Utah 1998); 2A Norman 
J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction 47:23-25 (2000). 
10 
should be siihstiiiitctf as ;i p;nt\ to? Dim m Mini gage t 'orpnmtion because 
CitiMortgage's motion was unopposed, but makes • ^gs regarding n e 
unauthenticated and unverified Statement of Facts recited in the memorandum in 
support of the motion to substitute CitiMortgage as a party. (R. 125) Accordingly, 
the trial court's order allowing CitiMortgage to be substituted in for Direct 
Ivluiigage Corporation made no determination as to whether Direct Mortgage 
Corpora i . -> ,.-•* . •* . • merest in the subject property. 
Indeer .... • * • . interest in 
the subject property at the time \ - •• :• - ^ -
raised in any way in the Citi Appellees' summary judgment papers. Arguments not 
briefed are waived.18 When they responded to Victor's Rule 59 memorandum, the 
Citi Appellees made no reference to the factual allegations in their memorandum 
in support of their motion to substitute in CitiMortgage as a party defendant, bul 
instead (TiniienirJU i lainied dial ViUm Iliad admitted in its complaint that Direct 
Mortgage Corpi>-'•'«»• - •• - -^
 : -• , K - • 
18
 See Semeco Industries v. State Tax Com fn, 849 F.. i -** r>) 
where the court held that arguments not briefed are waived 
19
 Further, the Citi Appellees' argument was without merit. Victor merely 
pled that Direct Mortgage Corporation uhold[s] some claim of right, title, or 
interest to the aforementioned property and PLAINTIFF alleges that all [Direct 
Mortgage Corporation's] claims of right, title or interest. . . [is] subject to the 
prior claims and interests of PLAINTIFF .. ." Victor did not allege that Direct 
Mortgage Corporation holds some right, title or interest in the subject property, 
.1 
failing to argue this assertion on this appeal to this Court, the Citi Appellees have 
waived it.20 See Addendum A, 1115. 
Moreover, if the Citi Appellees had raised the issue of Direct Mortgage 
Corporation's interest in the subject property at the time of the commencement of 
Victor's lien action, Victor would have put before the trial court a letter from legal 
counsel advising that it had no interest in the subject property and was willing to 
disclaim any interest in the subject property.21 This letter, which is an admission 
against interest,22 and so would have been admissible into evidence, belies the 
unproven assertion of CitiMortgage that Direct Mortgage Corporation transferred 
an interest in the subject property to it. 
but merely that it claims that it holds some right, title or interest in property. The 
former is an admission that a defendant has some interest in property, whatever it 
might be, but the latter is nothing more than an allegation that a defendant hold a 
claim to an interest, but does not admit that a defendant actually has an interest. 
20
 Id. 
21
 See Addendum B. 
22
 Rule 801(d)(2)(c) of the Utah Rules of Evidence makes "a statement by a 
person authorized by the party to make a statement concerning the subject", an 
admission by a party-opponent admissible in evidence. Under common law a 
statement by an agent can only be used against the principal if the agent is 
employed for the purpose of making the statement on behalf of the principal. Rule 
801(d)(2)(D) of the Utah Rules of Evidence goes even further and makes a 
statement by a party's agent made within the scope of that agency admissible. See 
United States v. McKeon, 738 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1984) where a statement made by 
an attorney on behalf of his client was admissible under the federal version of both 
of these rules. 
12 
As to the affidavit of Miriam Harper,, the Citi /::\ ppellees ne^  - er recited airy 
undisputed material fact alleging that they had an interest in the subject property 
and the exhibits to the Harper affidavit do not prove that Direct Mortgage 
Corporation had an interest in the subject property when Victor filed its lien 
action, nor do those exhibits show that the CitiMortgage is the successor in 
ci\^ >, .. ;rtgage Corporation •>». 
• * • : ••T-;v! s 1 lave ai i ii iterest in the sub ject 
property is to be found nowhere in their memorandi 1m in rt of their motioi 1 
for summary judgment. Rule 7(c)(3)(A) is explicit in requiring that a moving party 
must assert in its statement of undisputed material facts a dispositive fact relied 
upon in its motion for summary judgment. Victor cannot be expected to guess 
which factual allegations (especially unverified factual allegations) stated 
elsewl . ," • Appellees 11 ic; v. i \ he trial court will be relied 
recitation in their statement of material undisputed facts greatly pre judiccd V ictor 
because it was denied the opportunity to produce the letter from legal counsel for 
Direct Mortgage Corporation admitting it had no interest in the subject property, 
and was denied an opportunity to bring a Rule 56(f) motion to conduct discovery 
••at issue. 
13 
assert that they had an interest in the subject property and without that interest, 
they could incur no harm as a result of Victor's lien action and so had no standing 
to invoke the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1 l(3)(a). 
B. THERE IS NO ISSUE OF INADEQUATE BRIEFING BY THE 
APPELLANT 
A Rule 59 motion tolls the time for filing of a notice of appeal.23 Victor's 
notice of appeal recites that it is appealing from the "entire judgment of the trial 
court/' which demonstrates that Victor is not merely appealing the trial court's 
denial of Victor's Rule 59 motion. Further, both the January 16, 2007 order 
granting the Citi Appellees summary judgment and the trial court's order denying 
Victor a new trial covered the same ground: the merits of the Beech and Flynn 
affidavits and the Citi Appellees' memorandum in support of their motion for 
summary judgment. Accordingly, the trial court's order denying Victor's motion 
for a new trial necessarily re-affirmed its January 16, 2007 order granting the Citi 
Appellees summary judgment, meaning that both those orders are in issue on this 
appeal. 
Accordingly, this is not a case like Jensen v. Intermountain Power Agency, 
1999 UT 10,117, where some claims were decided on partial summary judgment 
and some were later decided by a jury, and in the notice of appeal only the jury 
23
 Moon Lake Electric Assoc., Inc. v. Ultrasystenas Western Constructors, 
Inc., 161 P.2d 125 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
14 
judgment was identified I here,, the claims were distinct, which meant that the 
summary judgment were in issue on the appeal, and thi is depri ved the appellee of 
an opportunity to file a cross appeal. Because in the case sub judice the Rule 59 
proceeding reviewed in full the prior summary judgment proceeding and because 
the trial court ruled in favor of the Appellee on all matters in issue, there is no 
issue of prejudice and no question of whether the appeal includes all of the matters 
dealt vv ith b> the trial court' s January 16, 200' 7 order granting the C iti Appellees 
I 111 ill ill III 111 \ | U ( l g i l l H I I I 
Instead, \ /• -.>r's Notice of \ ppeal conies w ithin the n lie stated in Scudder 
v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 886 P.2d 48, (Utah 1994), where the court in 
reviewing Ut. R. App. P. Rule 3(d) and the appellant's failure to identify in its 
Notice of Appeal the intermediate orders which were to be raised as issues in the 
appeal, held that the Notice of Appeal was sufficient to put those intermediate 
.^ nu,
 ;it was identified as the subject of the appeal. 
' I he same r ationale applies to ^ ? ictor's N otice :)f \ ppe al In identify ing tt le 
trial court's order denying a new trial and its final judgment of November 16, 2007 
(mistakenly dated as December 16, 2007) denying Victor a new trial, and then 
stating that the appeal is taken from the entire judgment, the Notice of Appeal put 
into issue the Citi Appellees entire case for summary judgment, meaning that the 
15 
trial court's order of January 16, 2007, which is subject to a correction of error 
standard, is properly before this Court. 
Victor in its opening brief at page 3 properly recited the correction of error 
standard for summary judgment rulings and then proceeded to brief for some 22 
pages why the district court was wrong in law in granting the Citi Appellees 
summary judgment. This briefing negates the Citi Appellees claim that there has 
been no showing that the district court committed reversible error. 
C. THE CITI APPELLEES LACK STANDING TO CONTEST 
VICTOR'S CLAIMS 
As was shown in Victor's opening brief24, this was an in rem action and 
unless the Citi Appellees had an interest in the subject property, they lacked 
standing to contest Victor's lien. At a summary judgment hearing the Citi 
Appellees, as defendants, must have some interest in the subject property before 
they have standing to contest Victor's lien.25 This is especially so where Utah 
Code Ann. § 38-1-1 l(3)(a) limits the right to the notice provided by the filing of a 
lis pendens to persons with an interest in the subject property.26 In Estate ofHaro 
24
 App. Br. pp. 12-15. 
25
 Cf. State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561, 567 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991)(defendant must 
be something more than a temporary visitor to a cabin to prosecute a 4th 
Amendment objection to a search of the cabin); see also State v. Ross, 2007 UT 
89,1f 25 (defendant not sentenced to death lacked standing to prosecute an 8th 
Amendment challenge to Utah's death penalty statute). 
26
 App. Br. pp. 9 -12. 
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i Haro, SS7 I1 M .S?,N 11 Kali ( L A|)|» I ""^ M » liu^ I o11r( lick) (hat where a statute 
specifically limited the persons liiiM 1)1 r in bring ,i vuniigllijl ih atli ,u hum In llu 
decedent's heir or personal representative, then an action common^^H h i -
person other those designated by statute would be a nullity because they lacked 
capacity to sue.27 
The fact that the Citi Appellees failed to make any showing that they had an 
u.!\ . . - v r property, which was the predicate to their being entitled to 
the sta : : . • • • * - ' • • pendens, means that like the 
Estate of Haro they lacked the st <• ---v*. . .IIIA,: .U -,JI re's 
entitlements. In this context, the concepts of standing ; r >M
 u La
f
- re 
essentially indistinguishable. Without that capacity, they could not be prejudiced 
by Victor's lien action28 and so had no standing to contest Victor's lien action. 
The requirement that a litigant have an interest in the res which is the 
sub(ei f 111 I he III igiil u Hi lias been frequently applied by the appellate courts of this 
State to both Plaintiffs and Defei idai its I I: le cases ci:, • • u ~^ a oove are 
representative of numerous criminal cases den> ing def endants standing to lai n ic 1 i 
consititutional challenges to particular criminal statutes, and those cases closely 
parallel cases like Wash. County Water Conservancy Dist. v. Morgan, 2003 UT 
27
 Haro at 880-81. 
^State \ '. 7 i: i) 4oi ,81 8 1 " 2,c \i il 56" ; ' ';' ' • " 
58, P 6 n.2, 82 P.3d 1125 (Utah 2003) in requiring litigants to have an interest in 
the subject matter of the dispute before they have standing. 
In that light, it would seem - with respect - that this Court's decision in 
Victor Plastering, Inc. v. Swanson Building Materials, Inc., 2008 UT App 474, 
represents a marked departure from a long line of cases which hold that where the 
terms of a statute exclude a litigant from its entitlements, the excluded litigant 
does not have standing to litigate the requirements of that statute, and on that basis 
this Court's decision in Victor Plastering should be reconsidered. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Citi Appellees failed to proffer any evidence in support of their claim 
that they did not withing 180 days have actual knowledge of the commencement 
of Victor's lien action. Absent that showing, the actual knowledge exception to the 
lis pendens requirements in Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1 l(3)(a) remains in issue and 
Victor is entitled to a reversal of the trial court's grant of summary judgment in 
favor of the Citi Appellees. 
DATED this 15th day of January, 2009. ^_ 
RONALDAD¥^ttorney for the 
Appellant Victor Plastering, Inc. 
18 
ADDENDUM: 
\mended Complaint of Victor Plastering, Inc. 
U. July 3, 2006 letter from Direct Mortgage Corporation. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
T c e r t i fy Hi;ii iiii ilii I n i h i k n "I J u m a i \, J l l l l ^ l ilrpnsiiet.1 I l ine c u p ' u l i h e 
"•
%regoing Appe lL in l - i ' Uriel in tin1 I mlei l S t a l e s mai l tirst i:lass p o s t a g e 
pre-paid 
LESLIE VAN FRANK 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
257 East 200 South, 7th Fir. 
P.O. Box 11008 / ^ l ^ ^ 
Salt Lake City UT 84147-0008^/^ ^\ 
Secretary 
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Tab A 
RONALD ADY (3694) 
10 West 100 South, Suite 425 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)539-1900 
Fax: (801)322-1054 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
!N Till', FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATU 01 li I AH 
VICTOR PLASTERING, INC, 
CHRIS A. COLLINS, CHANNA COLLINS, 
COBALT HOMES, INC. dba COBALT 
HOMES STYLE BUILDER & COBALT 
HOMES THE CEDARS L.L.C. dba 
COBALT HOMES STYLE BUILDERS, 
BRIAN K. BRADY, MASCO 
CONTRACTORS SERVICES, DIRECT 
MORTGAGE CORPORATION, 
CONSTRUCTION PRODUCTS 
COMPANY, SWANSON BUILDING 
MATERIALS, INC., DAVE'S QUALITY 
ROOFING, INC., CITIBANK FEDERAL 
SAVINGS BANK and JOHN DOES 1 
through 10. 
Defendants. 
AMENDED ('(IMI'I.AIN I1 
'-U401255 
Judge Hansen 
For complaint again* ! >• fendants, Plaintiff alleges as follows: 
1. !'i AJNTIFF is a Utah corporation its principal place of business in Utah County, State 
of Utah. 
2. Pi .AINTIFF is a stucco contractor duly licensed under the laws of the State of Utah. 
3. Defendants Chris A. Collins and Channa Collins ("Homeowners"), own an interest in real 
property located in Utah, State of Utah, having a legal description as follows: LOT 15, PLAT J2, 
CEDARS AT CEDAR HILLS SUBDIVISION, CEDAR HILLS (the "Property"). The Homeowners 
are named as defendants in this action solely for the purposes of proceeding against the real pioperty 
described above, and not to obtain any judgment or relief in personam against Homeowners. 
4. Defendant COBALT HOMES INC. and/or the Defendant COBALT HOMES INC. dba 
COBALT HOMES STYLE BUILDERS is a Utah corporation doing business in Utah County, State 
of Utah and at all times relevant to PLAINTIFF'S claims in this complaint, was licensed as a general 
contractor in the State of Utah. 
5. That the above-referenced property is a single family dwelling and may have been an 
owner-occupied residence that is not offered for sale to the public within the meaning of the 
Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act, Title 38, Chaptei l i of the Utah Code 
(hereinafter the FUND). 
6. That the Defendant Homeowners formerly occupied that residence or may have occupied 
the residence, or that the residence was or, after completion of the construction on the residence, may 
have been occupied by the owner or the owner's tenant and lessee as a primary ot secondary 
residence within 180 days from the date of the completion of the construction on the residence. 
7. That the Defendant Homeowner may have entered into a contract with Defendant 
COBALT HOMES INC. (hereinafter referred to as the Defendant Contractor) for the construction of 
an owner-occupied residence upon the above-described real property. 
8. That on or about September 19, 2005 the Defendant Homeowners filed a petition in 
bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the 
Southern District of California as case number 05-08818. On Schedule A of their Voluntary Petition 
2 
in that bankruptcy they show the above-described real property with a current market value of 
$208,000 and secured claims totaling $256,824.00. On Schedule C of that Petition they claim 
$18,675.00 of that real property as exempt. In paragraph 15 of the Statement of Financial Affairs 
attached to that petition, the Defendant Homeowners show that they last occupied the above-described 
real property on January 5,2005. On Defendant Homeowners Statement of Intentions filed with that 
petition, they identify the above described real property as "Property to be Surrendered"and list 
Citibank and Citimortgage as the creditor's name relating to that property. 
9. That the Defendant Contractor may have been a licensed contractor at all times when it was 
building the aforementioned owner-occupied residence. 
10. PLAINTIFF and Defendant Contractor entered into a contract under which PLAINTIFF 
was to construct certain improvements to the Property on behalf of Defendant Homeowners. 
11. PLAINTIFF first provided materials and labor for the Property on or about September 26, 
2003. 
12. On or about October 16, 2003, PLAINTIFF completed the contracted improvements to 
the Property. 
13. PLAINTIFF has demanded payment from Cobalt and Collins, who have refused to make 
payment. 
14.0n January 14,2004, PLAINTIFF recorded a mechanic's lien against the Property pursuant 
to UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-7 (1953, as amended) in the amount of $16,250.00, notice of which 
was mailed via certified mail to Defendants. 
15. That Defendants, CHRIS A. COLLINS and CHANNA M. COLLINS, MASCO 
CONTRACTORS SERVICES, DIRECT MORTGAGE CORPORATION, CONSTRUCTION 
PRODUCTS COMPANY, SWANSON BUILDING MATERIALS, INC., DAVE'S QUALITY 
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ROOFING, INC., CITIBANK FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK and JOHN DOES 1 through 10 all hold 
some claim of right, title, or interest to the aforementioned property and PLAINTIFF alleges that all 
of the claims of right, title or interest of each of these Defendants and all persons claiming by, 
through, or under them, are junior, inferior, and subject to the prior claims and interest of 
PLAINTIFF, or that the claims, if any, of any other person or entity (Doe Defendants) who may assert 
an interest in the properties should be litigated herein and priorities established. 
CLAIM ONE: FORECLOSURE ON MECHANICS LIEN 
16. PLAINTIFF incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding 
paragraphs. 
17. As a result of the Defendant Contractor's breach of contract, PLAINTIFF has been 
compelled to prepare and file Notice of Liens, a copy of which said Liens are herewith attached and 
incorporated as Exhibit IM,AfI,f. 
18. That if the Defendant Homeowners can establish that he or she has complied with the 
FUND, he or she may become exempt from the Lien and Bond Statutes of the State of Utah. As 
required by §38-1-11 of the Utah Code, a form ""Homeowner's Application For Certificate of 
Compliance"" and Instructions are attached hereto as Exhibit ""B"" for the Defendant Homeowner's 
use. 
19. That pursuant to §38-1-11(4) (d) of the Utah Code, this Court must stay proceedings as 
to the Defendant Homeowners until such time as the Defendant Homeowners have had a reasonable 
period of time to establish compliance with §38-11-204(4) (a) and (4) (b) of the Utah Code through 
an informal proceeding, as set forth in Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, 
commenced within 30 days of the owner being served summons in the foreclosure action, at the 
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing and obtain a certificate of compliance or denial 
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of certificate of compliance, as defined in §38-11-102 of the Utah Code. 
20. That the Defendant Homeowners have had 30 days from the date of service of the 
Complaint upon them in this action to complete and file the Homeowners Application for Certificate 
of Compliance with the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing for the State of Utah, 
as required by §38-1-11 of the Utah Code, in default of which the Defendant Homeowners lose the 
protection they otherwise may have under the FUND. 
21. That if the Defendant Homeowners cannot establish that they have complied with the 
FUND, PLAINTIFF is entitled to a Decree of Foreclosure of PLAINTIFF'S Mechanic's Lien and to 
an Order of Sale that the Sheriff conduct a sale and apply the proceeds from said sale first, to the cost 
of sale; second, to the satisfaction of PLAINTIFF'S Lien, interest, Court costs, accrued interest 
pursuant to statute and attorney's fees; and third, that any surplus be given to the rightful claimants 
and owners. 
CLAIM TWO: BREACH OF CONTRACT 
22. PLAINTIFF incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding 
paragraphs. 
23. Cobalt has breached its contract with PLAINTIFF and PLAINTIFF is entitled to damages 
in the contract amount of$ 16,250.00 or as may be proven at trial plus accrued interest pursuant to 
statute. 
CLAIM THREE: UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
24. PLAINTIFF incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding 
paragraphs. 
25. PLAINTIFF has provided materials and services to Defendant(s) equal to or in excess of 
the amount of $16,250.00. 
• 5 
26. The materials and services provided by PLAINTIFF have increased the value of the 
properties where the materials were placed and/or the value of the Defendant Contractor's business. 
27. Upon information and belief, PLAINTIFF alleges that Defendant, BRIAN K. BRADY, 
who is the controlling and operating shareholder behind the Defendant corporation, COBALT 
HOMES INC., has been unjustly enriched in the amount of $16,250.00 or the Defendant, COBALT 
HOMES INC., has been unjustly enriched in the same amount. 
28. PLAINTIFF is entitled to compensation from Defendants, COBALT HOMES INC., 
and/or BRIAN K. BRADY for the value of the services and material provided and for the amount by 
which Defendant has been unjustly enriched, which amount is $16,250.00, plus interest through 
October 16, 2003 and continuing interest thereon from said date at the rate of 12% per annum until 
paid as provided by Section 58-55-603 of the Utah Code Annotated (1953), plus any costs of court 
and attorney's fees as allowed by Rule 73 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
29. Defendants have refused to make payment to PLAINTIFF for the material and services 
provided and to allow Defendants to retain the benefit of the materials and service provided by 
PLAINTIFFS will unjustly enrich Defendants. 
30. Therefore PLAINTIFF should be allowed to recover from Defendants COBALT HOMES 
INC., and/or BRIAN K. BRADY the value of the materials and services rendered in the amount of 
$16,250.00, plus interest through Febnruary 3, 2006 and continuing interest thereon from said date 
at the rate of 12% per annum until paid as provided by Section 58- 55-603 of the Utah Code 
Annotated (1953), plus any costs of court and attorney's fees in order to prevent unjust enrichment. 
WHEREFORE, PLAINTIFF prays for relief against Defendants as follows: 
1. For judgment against the Defendants, BRIAN K. BRADY, and COBALT HOMES INC.. 
for breach of contract in the amount of $16,250.00, plus interest through October 16, 2003 and 
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continuing interest thereon from said date at the rate of 12% per annum until paid, plus attorney's fees 
in the amount of at least $775.00, as allowed by Rule 73 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, by 
contract and by UCA 38-1-18 et sec, plus all costs of Court. 
2. For a declaration that but for the Defendant Homeowners chapter 7 bankruptcy, Plaintiff 
would be entitled to a judgment against the Defendant Homeowners, Chris A. Collins and Channa M. 
Collins, in the amount of $16,250.00, plus interest through October 16,2003 and continuing interest 
thereon from said date at the rate of 12% per annum until paid, plus Court costs, reasonable attorney's 
fees of at least $775.00, as allowed by Rule 73 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,.by contract and 
by UCA 38-1-18 et sec, plus all costs of Court. 
3. That the Court adjudge that PLAINTIFF'S Lien, attached hereto, is valid and that 
PLAINTIFF is entitled to the amount stated in said Lien, plus Court costs, reasonable attorney's fees, 
and interest at the rate and in the amount allowed by contract and by law. 
4. For an Order that PLAINTIFF'S Mechanic's Lien is prior to and superior to the interests of 
all Defendants herein. 
5. For a Decree of Foreclosure of PLAINTIFF'S Mechanics Lien and for an Order that the 
Sheriff of Utah County conduct a sale and apply the proceeds from said sale first to the cost of sale; 
second, to the satisfaction of PLAINTIFF'S Lien, interest, Court costs and attorney's fees; and third, 
that any surplus be given to the rightful claimants and owners. 
6. In the event that said sale is not sufficient to satisfy the entire amount of the lien, including 
all applicable interest, Court costs, and attorney's fees, as proscribed by law, PLAINTIFF prays for 
a Deficiency Judgment against the record owners of the property in the amount remaining due as to 
said property, as provided for by §38-1-16 of the Utah Code Annotated(1953). 
7. For an order of foreclosure of the mechanic's lien recorded by PLAINTIFF against, the 
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Pioperty for the amount of$ 16,250.00 plus attorney's fees, court costs, and accrued interest pursuant 
to statute; 
8. For judgment against Defendants COBALT HOMES INC. for damages in the amount of 
$16,250.00 and for a declaration that but for the Defendant Collins chapter 7 bankruptcy Plaintiff 
would be entitled to a judgment against Defendants Collins and COBALT HOMES INC., jointly and 
severally, for damages in the amount of $16,250.00; 
9. For pre-judgment interest pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 15-1-1; 
10. For such other relief as the Court deems reasonable in the premises. 
Dated this 12th of April 2004. 
RONALD ATTY 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
PLAINTIFF DEMANDS A JURY TRIAL 
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R A Y Q U I N N E Y & N E B E K E R 
HAND-DELIVERED 
Ronald W. Ady, Esq. 
10W. 100 South, #425 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
July 3, 2006 
Stephen C. Tingey 
\TTORNEY AT LAW 
30 Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
B4145-0385 
36 South State Street 
Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
34111 
301 532-1500 FIRM 
501 323-3360 DIRECT 
301 532-7543 FAX 
jt'ngey@rqn com 
ivww rqn com 
Re: 
Dear Ron: 
Victor Plastering, Inc. v. Collins, et al. 
Civil No. 040401255 
I represent Direct Mortgage Corporation ("DMC"). You have named 
DMC as a party defendant in your recent Amended Complaint. My reading of 
the Amended Complaint is that the claim against DMC is solely to foreclose 
DMC's interest in the property. DMC no longer holds any interest in the 
property. DMC would be willing to execute a disclaimer of interest in the 
property, with the understanding that with that disclaimer, you will voluntarily 
dismiss the Amended Complaint as to DMC. Please let me know if that 
approach is acceptable to you. Thank you for your courtesy. 
Very truly yours, 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER, P.C. 
Stephen C. Tingey U I 
SCT:LL 
cc: Direct Mortgage Corp. 
880609/SCT 
P R O F E S S I O N A L C O R P O R A T I O N 
